Making muslim babies: Ivf and gamete donation in sunni versus shi’a islam by unknown
MARCIA C. INHORN
MAKING MUSLIM BABIES: IVF AND GAMETE DONATION
IN SUNNI VERSUS SHI’A ISLAM
ABSTRACT. Medical anthropological research on science, biotechnology, and
religion has focused on the ‘‘local moral worlds’’ of men and women as they make
diﬃcult decisions regarding their health and the beginnings and endings of human
life. This paper focuses on the local moral worlds of infertile Muslims as they attempt
to make, in the religiously correct fashion, Muslim babies at in vitro fertilization
(IVF) clinics in Egypt and Lebanon. As early as 1980, authoritative fatwas issued
from Egypt’s famed Al-Azhar University suggested that IVF and similar technolo-
gies are permissible as long as they do not involve any form of third-party donation
(of sperm, eggs, embryos, or uteruses). Since the late 1990s, however, divergences in
opinion over third-party gamete donation have occurred between Sunni and Shi’ite
Muslims, with Iran’s leading ayatollah permitting gamete donation under certain
conditions. This Iranian fatwa has had profound implications for the country of
Lebanon, where a Shi’ite majority also seeks IVF services. Based on three periods of
ethnographic research in Egyptian and Lebanese IVF clinics, this paper explores
oﬃcial and unoﬃcial religious discourses surrounding the practice of IVF and third-
party donation in the Muslim world, as well as the gender implications of gamete
donation for Muslim marriages.
KEYWORDS: In vitro fertilization, gamete donation, Islam, medical anthropology,
Middle East
INTRODUCTION: MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES
In recent years, medical anthropologists have been turning their ethno-
graphic attention to issues of science and technology, including how science
is produced, where it is produced, by whom, and when. Anthropologists
have also highlighted how scientiﬁc and technological advancements spread
around the world, gradually being incorporated into the lives of ordinary
people in many global sites. In order to document the production and
reproduction of new scientiﬁc and technological discoveries, medical
anthropologists have begun to take their ethnographic research projects into
previously unexplored terrains, including hospitals, scientiﬁc research lab-
oratories, clinical consultation rooms, and other ‘‘behind the scenes’’ places
where the culture of science and technology is perhaps best revealed. Fur-
thermore, most of the medical anthropologists working in this ﬁeld have
documented the ways in which the scientiﬁc and the divine seem to have
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intermingled, not only among the patients who turn to religious theodicies
to make sense of their suﬀering, but also among the scientists and clinicians
who deliver medical services and attempt to oﬀer patients hope. These
recent medical anthropological eﬀorts to document the intersections of
science, technology, and religion are clearly reﬂected in the theme of the
2004 annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association:
‘‘Magic, Science, and Religion.’’ Furthermore, this special issue of Culture,
Medicine and Psychiatry reﬂects the ongoing importance of religion to
science, medicine, and biotechnology, including in the Muslim world.
Medical anthropology has much to oﬀer to discussions of science, med-
icine, and religion, as demonstrated in a number of award-winning books on
these subjects. To take but a few recent examples, in Testing Women, Testing
the Fetus: The Social Impact of Amniocentesis in America, medical anthro-
pologist Rayna Rapp (1999) reveals the eﬀorts of more than ten years’
worth of extensive ethnographic research conducted at New York City
hospitals, genetic counseling and testing centers, and genetics laboratories
themselves. Her book focuses on the diﬃcult decision-making of pregnant
women from multiple ethnic, religious, and economic backgrounds, who are
asked by clinicians and advised by genetic counselors to undergo amnio-
centesis in order to detect genetic anomalies in their fetuses. Although the
scientiﬁc ﬁeld of genetics is burgeoning with excitement, Rapp’s intent in
Testing Women, Testing the Fetus is to show how women who are expected
to use new genetic tests during pregnancy are put in the diﬃcult position of
being ‘‘moral pioneers:’’ namely, they are forced to make often heart-
wrenching moral decisions about what constitutes an acceptable human life.
Whereas Rapp’s book focuses on decisions about bringing life into the
world, a book by medical anthropologist Margaret Lock asks us to consider
decisions about ending lives considered ‘‘brain dead.’’ Twice Dead: Organ
Transplants and the Reinvention of Death, Lock’s (2002) ethnography,
examines the history of organ transplantation in North America over the
past 20 years. Scientiﬁc advancements in transplant technology have made it
possible for North American surgeons to perform thousands of transplants
each year. In the majority of these cases, individuals diagnosed as ‘‘brain
dead’’ are the source of the organs, without which transplants could not
take place. Lock asks her readers to consider what is meant by ‘‘brain
death,’’ and how it might be viewed diﬀerently in another culture, namely,
Japan. Despite the availability of the necessary technology and expertise,
Japanese society has not accepted the notion of brain death as a suﬃcient
criterion of death, following a well-informed but heated public debate on the
topic. Although brain death was legally recognized in Japan in 1997, it is
authorized only in limited circumstances, meaning that organ transplantation
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in Japan is not widespread. Drawing on extensive interviews conducted over
ten years with Intensive Care Unit (ICU) physicians, transplant surgeons,
organ recipients, donor families, Japanese political activists opposed to the
recognition of brain death, and members of the general public in both Japan
and North America, Lock shows us that death itself is not a self-evident,
biological event. Rather, it is surrounded by morally troubling cultural,
medical, legal, and political dimensions.
Lock’s book clearly demonstrates the degree to which medical anthro-
pology is concerned with comparative cultural perspectives, particularly in
an era of rapid globalization. Indeed, medical anthropology as a discipline
can be said to focus on the ‘‘local in the global.’’ In other words, local
considerations, be they cultural, social, economic, or political, shape and
sometimes curtail the way that Western-generated scientiﬁc technologies are
both oﬀered to and received by non-Western subjects. New forms of science
and technology are not transferred into cultural voids when they reach
places like Japan. Thus, the assumption on the part of global producer
nations that new biotechnologies—as value-free, inherently beneﬁcial
medical technologies—are ‘‘immune’’ to culture and can thus be appropri-
ately transferred and implemented anywhere and everywhere is subject to
challenge once local formulations, perceptions, and actual consumption of
these technologies are taken into consideration (Inhorn 2003a).
Indeed, the global spread of biotechnologies provides a particularly
salient but little discussed example of what anthropologist Arjun Appadurai
(1996) has termed a ‘‘technoscape,’’ or the ‘‘global conﬁguration, also ever
ﬂuid, of technology, and the fact that technology, both high and low, both
mechanical and informational, now moves at high speeds across various
kinds of previously impervious boundaries.’’ Appadurai reminds us that this
movement of technologies around the globe is both a deeply historical and
an inherently localizing process. In other words, globalization is not enacted
in a uniform manner around the world, nor is it simply culturally homog-
enizing—necessarily ‘‘Westernizing’’ or even ‘‘Americanizing’’ in its eﬀects.
The global is always imbued with local meaning, such that local actors,
living their everyday lives at particular historical moments in particular
places, mold the very form that global processes take (Freeman 2000).
This acknowledgment of the importance of locality in the global disper-
sion of modern biotechnologies has been a theme of much recent work in
medical anthropology. Similarly, much of this anthropological concern with
locality has to do with local moral systems, or what medical anthropologist/
psychiatrist Arthur Kleinman (1995) has called ‘‘local moral worlds’’ of pain
and suﬀering. According to Kleinman (45), local moral worlds are ‘‘moral
accounts, [which] are the commitments of social participants in a local world
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about what is at stake in everyday experience.’’ Through an ‘‘ethnography
of experience,’’ Kleinman urges medical anthropologists to pay close
attention to the moral issues that may accompany the arrival of new
biotechnologies around the globe. In his recent powerful and path-breaking
book, What Really Matters: Living a Moral Life amidst Uncertainty and
Danger, Kleinman (2006) asks us to carefully consider what it really means
to live a ‘‘moral life,’’ particularly in the midst of life-or-death decision-
making.
This focus on the ‘‘local moral’’ is found in another award-winning book
on the topic of IVF. Titled Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted
Conception in Israel, this book by medical anthropologist Susan Martha
Kahn (2000; see also her article in this special issue) takes us into the often
arcane world of Jewish Halakhic law, where male rabbis legislate on the
appropriate uses of IVF for their followers. Kahn carefully describes how
these rabbinical debates and decisions aﬀect the actual practice of Israeli
IVF. For example, third-party donation of gametes, including sperm
donation, is allowed, since Jewishness is seen to be conferred through the
mother’s side, particularly through the act of gestating and birthing the
baby. However, most conservative rabbis prefer that non-Jewish donor
sperm be used, to prevent adultery between a Jewish man and a Jewish
woman and to prevent future genetic incest among the oﬀspring of anon-
ymous donors in this small, intermarrying country. Furthermore, debates
have revolved around whether surrogacy should be allowed for infertile
couples, using single or married surrogates. Generally speaking, single
Jewish women are preferred as surrogates, both to avoid the implications of
adultery for married surrogate women and to confer Jewishness through a
Jewish woman’s gestation of the fetus. Finally, because the Jewish state is
pronatalist—with the state subsidizing up to six cycles of IVF or up to the
birth of two IVF children for any given Jewish patient—rabbis have
generally been permissive when it comes to single career women, as well as
lesbian Jewish mothers, conceiving children through assisted conceptive
means.
Kahn’s fascinating and frankly funny book details the sometimes dizzying
rabbinical arguments regarding morally appropriate and inappropriate
reproduction. In so doing, the book bespeaks the importance of local reli-
gious moralities in the contemporary world of Israeli assisted conception.
There, doctors in many clinics serving orthodox Jewish patient populations
attempt to practice IVF according to the moral dictates set forth by reli-
giously conservative rabbis. The IVF laboratories in these clinics are full of
orthodox women called maschigots, who literally peer over the shoulders of
laboratory technicians to make sure that the correct sperm and correct eggs
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are being united—so as not to produce a mamzer, or an illegitimate child. In
her book, Kahn is explicit in stating that the American consumer model of
free-market reproductive medicine has yet to take hold in Israel, with its
concern over religious guidelines. Nonetheless, Israel’s relative permissive-
ness over the use of donor gametes, surrogacy, and single and lesbian
motherhood stands in stark contrast to the Muslim Middle East, including
both neighboring Egypt and Lebanon, where I have conducted my own
ethnographic research on IVF.
IVF IN THE MUSLIM MIDDLE EAST
With this background in mind, it is my goal in this article to take readers
into the heart of the Muslim Middle East, thereby showing how the practice
of IVF in Israel, the country located between Egypt and Lebanon, diﬀers
signiﬁcantly from that in both of its Muslim neighbors. During more than
two years of medical anthropological ﬁeldwork in Egypt (1988–89, 1996)
and Lebanon (2003), I conducted in-depth, ethnographic interviews with
infertile Muslim IVF patients, both husbands and wives, now totaling nearly
500 patient couples. Furthermore, since the mid-1990s, I have focused my
research on the rapid expansion of IVF technologies into this region of the
Muslim world. Indeed, it is fair to assert that since the birth in 1978 of
Louise Brown, the world’s ﬁrst test-tube baby, IVF has spread around the
globe, reaching countries far from the technology-producing nations of the
West. Perhaps nowhere is this globalization process more evident than in the
22 nations of the Muslim Middle East, where a private IVF industry is
ﬂourishing. As of 2003, Egypt alone (population 70 million) boasted 50 IVF
centers, and the tiny country of Lebanon (population 4 million) boasted
more than 15 IVF centers, one of the highest per capita concentrations in
the world. These global metrics are impressive compared to the IVF tech-
nology-producing nation of Israel, where 24 IVF centers cater to a popu-
lation of 6 million (Kahn 2000).
In both Egypt and Lebanon, as in other Muslim countries, nonbinding
but authoritative Islamic religious proclamations called fatwas have
profoundly aﬀected the practice of IVF in ways that are not commonly seen
in the West. Indeed, in the Muslim world, infertile couples are usually
extremely concerned about making their test-tube babies in the religiously
correct fashion. To that end, they seek out the ‘‘oﬃcial’’ Islamic opinion on
the practice of IVF in the form of a fatwa. In recent years, many such fatwas
on a wide variety of reproductive health issues have been issued in Egypt
and other Muslim countries (Lane and Rubinstein 1991; Zuhur 1992). But
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as we shall see in this paper, major divergences have occurred between Sunni
and Shi’ite religious authorities regarding the permissibility of third-party
gamete donation, with new fatwas emerging from the Shi’ite world in recent
years. It is the diﬀerences between Sunni and Shi’a Islam with regard to
third-party gamete donation that constitute the focus of this article.
Sunni Islam and IVF
IVF was ﬁrst practiced in the Sunni Muslim world, with clinics opening in
the mid-1980s in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, all Sunni-majority
countries. The Grand Shaikh of Egypt’s famed religious university, Al
Azhar, issued the ﬁrst widely authoritative fatwa on medically assisted
reproduction on March 23, 1980. This fatwa—issued only two years after
the birth of the ﬁrst IVF baby in England but a full six years before the
opening of Egypt’s ﬁrst IVF center—has proved to be truly enduring in all
its main points (Inhorn 2006a). In fact, the basic tenets of the original
Al-Azhar fatwa on IVF have been upheld by other fatwas issued since 1980
and have achieved wide acceptance throughout the Sunni Muslim world.
Sunni Islam, it must be emphasized, is the dominant form of Islam found in
the Middle Eastern region and throughout the Muslim world. Between 80
and 90 percent of the world’s Muslims are Sunni, and more than 90 percent
of Egypt’s citizens are Sunni Muslims, the rest being predominantly Coptic
Christian.
The degree to which these oﬃcial Sunni Islamic fatwas on IVF have
aﬀected the actual practices of the Middle Eastern medical profession is also
quite striking. For physicians, the dominant Sunni religious opinion on IVF
has been made known to the Middle Eastern medical community through
the writings of Gamal I. Serour, one of three founding members of the ﬁrst
Egyptian IVF center and the director of Al-Azhar’s International Islamic
Center for Population Studies and Research. In article after article (Serour
1992, 1994, 1996; Serour and Omran 1992; Serour, El Ghar, and Mansour
1990, 1991; Serour, Aboulghar, and Mansour 1995), Serour has spelled out
the main points of the Sunni Islamic position on medically assisted
conception, as follows:
(1) Artiﬁcial insemination with the husband’s semen is allowed, and the
resulting child is the legal oﬀspring of the couple.
(2) In vitro fertilization of an egg from the wife with the sperm of her
husband followed by the transfer of the fertilized embryo(s) back to
the uterus of the wife is allowed, provided that the procedure is
indicated for a medical reason and is carried out by an expert
physician.
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(3) No third party should intrude into the marital functions of sex and
procreation, because marriage is a contract between the wife and
husband during the span of their marriage. This means that a third
party donor is not allowed, whether he or she is providing sperm,
eggs, embryos, or a uterus. The use of a third party is tantamount
to zina, or adultery.
(4) Adoption of a donor child from an illegitimate form of medically
assisted conception is not allowed. The child who results from a
forbidden method belongs to the mother who delivered him/her. He
or she is considered to be a laqit, or an illegitimate child.
(5) If the marriage contract has come to an end because of divorce or
death of the husband, medically assisted conception cannot be
performed on the ex-wife even if the sperm comes from the former
husband.
(6) An excess number of fertilized embryos can be preserved by cryo-
preservation. The frozen embryos are the property of the couple
alone and may be transferred to the same wife in a successive cycle,
but only during the duration of the marriage contract.
(7) Multifetal pregnancy reduction (or so-called selective abortion) is
only allowed if the prospect of carrying a high-order pregnancy
(i.e., twins, triplets, or more) to viability is very small. It is also
allowed if the health or life of the mother is in jeopardy.
(8) All forms of surrogacy are forbidden.
(9) Establishment of sperm banks is strictly forbidden, for such a
practice threatens the existence of the family and the ‘‘race’’ and
should be prevented.
(10) The physician is the only qualiﬁed person to practice medically
assisted conception in all its permitted varieties. If he performs any
of the forbidden techniques, he is guilty, his earnings are forbidden,
and he must be stopped from his morally illicit practice.
But to what degree are these fatwa declarations—particularly the explicit
prohibition on any form of third-party donation of reproductive materi-
als—actually followed by physicians in the Muslim world? A global survey
of sperm donation among assisted reproductive technology centers in 62
countries provides some indication of the degree of convergence between
oﬃcial discourse and actual practice (Meirow and Schenker 1997). In all of
the Muslim countries surveyed in the mid-1990s—including the Middle
Eastern countries of Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Qatar, and Turkey, as well as a number of non-Middle Eastern Muslim
countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan—sperm donation in
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IVF and all other forms of gamete donation were strictly prohibited. As the
authors of this global survey, Meirow and Schenker (1997), state, ‘‘In many
Islamic countries, where the laws of Islam are the laws of the state, donation
of sperm was not practiced. AID [Artiﬁcial Insemination, Donor] is con-
sidered adultery and leads to confusion regarding the lines of genealogy,
whose purity is of prime importance in Islam’’ (134).
In summary, in the Sunni-majority countries of the Middle East and the
rest of the Sunni Muslim world, prohibitions against gamete donation have
been enacted either in law or in professional medical codes of ethics. As a
result, gamete donation is not legally practiced in the Sunni Muslim world,
with clinics turning away (or referring to other European countries) couples
who require these services. In Sunni Muslim countries such as Egypt, the
thought of using donor gametes is reprehensible to most infertile Muslim
(and even Christian) couples, who agree completely with the bans on third-
party donation dictated by the religion and upheld through medical codes of
ethics (Inhorn 2003b). As shown in the next section, however, the situation
is changing for Shi’ite Muslims, whose leading cleric has taken a bold step in
a new direction.
Shi’a Islam and IVF
For Shi’ite Muslims, attitudes toward gamete donation have changed con-
siderably since the late 1990s. Shi’a is the minority branch of Islam found in
Iran, parts of Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, as well as
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It has been much in the news lately be-
cause of the United States–led war in Iraq, the conﬂict between Lebanon
and Israel, and the current tensions between the United States and Iran.
Until recently, most Shi’ite religious authorities have supported the majority
Sunni view: namely, they have agreed with Sunni clerics who say that third-
party donation should be strictly prohibited.
In the late 1990s, however, the Supreme Jurisprudent of the Shi’a branch
of Islam, Ayatollah Ali Hussein Khamanei, the handpicked successor to
Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa eﬀectively permitting donor
technologies to be used. This fatwa has proved to be very signiﬁcant for
those Shi’a who follow the lead of Ayatollah Khamanei in Iran. This would
include Lebanon’s Hizbullah leaders, who consider Ayatollah Khamanei to
be their marja’ taqlid, or spiritual reference (literally, source of emulation).
With regard to egg donation, Ayatollah Khamanei stated in his initial
fatwa that egg donation ‘‘is not in and of itself legally forbidden.’’ But he
stated that both the egg donor and the infertile mother must abide by the
religious codes regarding parenting. Thus, the child of the egg donor has the
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right to inherit from her, as the infertile woman who received the eggs is
considered to be like an adoptive mother.
With regard to sperm donation, Ayatollah Khamanei said in his original
fatwa that the baby born of sperm donation will follow the name of the
infertile father rather than the sperm donor. However, as with egg donation,
the donor child can only inherit from his biological father, the sperm donor,
since the infertile father is considered to be like an adoptive father.
The situation for Shi’ite Muslims is actually much more complicated than
this, however, given two Shi’ite religious practices called ijtihad and mutca.
Unlike Sunni Muslim scholars who are scripturally based in their thinking,
Shi’ite religious authorities give precedence to a form of individual religious
reasoning known as ijtihad. Through the use of caql, or intellectual rea-
soning, various Shi’ite ulama have come to their own conclusions regarding
the rightness or wrongness of gamete donation. Some Shi’ite clerics continue
to prohibit gamete donation for their followers, while others have allowed it
under certain conditions. As many scholars of Shi’a have noted (Cole 2002;
Tober 2004), the practice of ijtihad has allowed a certain ﬂexibility and
pragmatism toward new technological developments, including IVF and a
number of other new medical technologies (e.g., contraception, organ
transplants, transgender surgery). Furthermore, ijtihad has ultimately led to
great heterogeneity of opinion and practice within the Shi’ite community.
Additionally, Shi’a Islam allows a form of temporary marriage called
mutca (also called sigheh in Iran), which is not recognized by Sunni religious
authorities (Zuhur 1992). In Shi’a Islam, mutca is a union between an
unmarried Muslim woman and a married or unmarried Muslim man, which
is contracted for a ﬁxed time period in return for a set amount of money. It
is practiced in Iran (Haeri 1989), as well as in other parts of the Shi’ite
world. In the past, middle-aged and older women who were divorced or
widowed often engaged in mutca marriages for ﬁnancial support. In Iran,
following the loss of men during the devastating, eight-year Iran–Iraq war,
former Iranian President Rafsanjani recommended mutca as a means of
protecting the large numbers of single or widowed women who had no other
source of income. For Shi’ite men, mutca marriages could be contracted
while traveling, or as a way of achieving marital variety and sexual pleasure
(Haeri 1989). Since the arrival of donor technologies, however, mutca has
also been invoked to make egg donation legal within the parameters of
marriage.
Within this context of ijtihad and mutca, Shi’a religious authorities who
now accept the idea of donation, but are strict in their interpretation of how
donation should be practiced, argue that
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(1) when a couple needs a donor, they should go to a Shi’ite religious
court, where a decision can be made on a case-by-case basis;
(2) there should be a determination about which religious ‘‘reference’’
(i.e., source of spiritual emulation) the infertile couple follows;
(3) the decision should be made in the presence of witnesses, the IVF
doctor, and with the agreement of both parties (the infertile couple
and the donor);
(4) the husband should do a mutca marriage with the egg donor for the
period of time in which the whole procedure (egg retrieval to em-
bryo transfer) is taking place, because polygyny is legal in Islam and
avoids the implications of zina, or adultery;
(5) but because a married Shi’ite Muslim woman cannot marry another
man other than her husband (since polyandry is illegal in Islam),
she cannot do a mutca marriage with a sperm donor. Technically,
the child born of a sperm donor would be a laqit, or out-of-wedlock
child, without a family name and without a father. Thus, in theory,
only widowed or otherwise single women should be able to accept
donor sperm, in order to avoid the implications of zina. However,
in the Muslim countries, single motherhood of a donor child is
unlikely to be socially acceptable (Inhorn 1996; Zuhur 1992).
Be that as it may, divergent gamete donation practices are beginning to
emerge in the Shi’ite Muslim world, as religious authorities come to their
own conclusions about third-party donation. Among Shi’ite religious
scholars, the major disagreements, or religious ‘‘sticking points,’’ revolve
around the following set of issues:
(1) whether sperm donation should be allowed at all;
(2) whether the child should follow the name of the infertile father or
the sperm donor;
(3) whether the child should inherit from the infertile father or the
sperm donor;
(4) whether donor children and their ‘‘social’’ parents are related at all,
and, if not, whether they could potentially marry each other, which
has implications for proper comportment in domestic life (e.g.,
bathing, veiling, etc.);1
(5) whether donation is permissible at all if the donors are anonymous;
(6) whether a ﬁnancial transaction should be allowed between gamete
donors and recipients;
(7) whether the husband of an infertile woman needs to do a temporary
mutca marriage with the egg donor, then divorce her after the
embryo transfer (48 to 72 hours later), in order to avoid zina. For
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his part, Khamanei clearly stipulates that mutca marriage is not
required, for he believes that zina requires the physical act of
intercourse (Clarke 2006); and
(8) whether the wife of an infertile husband can temporarily divorce
her infertile husband, remarrying him after accepting sperm from a
donor (Tremayne, personal communication, 5/5/06).
These disagreements of opinion have played out in interesting ways. As
shown in anthropologist Morgan Clarke’s (2006) recent research on the
Shi’ite religious discourses surrounding gamete donation, many Shi’ite
ulama do not agree with Khamanei’s permissive fatwa on donor technolo-
gies, because they do not regard him as a brilliant legal thinker. For
example, Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Lebanon’s most
prominent Shi’ite religious ﬁgure, does not agree with Ayatollah Khama-
nei’s permission of sperm donation, although he agrees with the permission
of egg donation. Neither of them requires the use of mutca marriages to
solve the zina issue (Clarke 2006).
Ayatollah Fadlallah’s positions opposing sperm donation but supporting
egg donation square with the dominant religious discourse in Iran. There,
the religious rulings regarding gamete donation have evolved quickly, with
sperm donation now eﬀectively banned (Soraya Tremayne, personal com-
munication, 23 July 2004, 31 July 2004).2 Namely, a law on gamete donation
passed in 2003 in the Iranian parliament (majlis) and approved by the
Guardian Council (i.e., a religious ‘‘watchdog’’ body that endorses every bill
before it becomes law) has restricted gamete donation to married persons.
Even though the law is brief (less than one page), it states clearly and
succinctly who can and cannot donate and receive gametes. Egg donation is
allowed, as long as the husband marries the egg donor temporarily—thereby
ensuring that all three parties are married. Sperm donation, on the other
hand, is legally forbidden, because a sperm donor cannot temporarily marry
an already married woman whose husband is infertile. Quite interestingly,
however, embryo donation—which involves both sperm and egg from
another couple—is allowed in order to overcome both male and female
infertility. Because an embryo comes from a married couple and is given to
another married couple, it is considered hallal, or religiously permissible.
The social and biological implications of embryo donation are quite
interesting. For Iranian couples unable to produce a child because of male
infertility, embryo donation allows them to bypass the problem of the
husband’s weak (or absent) sperm. However, embryo donation does not
allow a presumably fertile wife of an infertile husband to contribute her own
ova, in eﬀect severing her biological ties to the donor child. Furthermore,
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and most strikingly, embryos donated from another married couple involve
both egg and sperm donation. Even though direct sperm donation is
bypassed via the injection of another man’s sperm into the wife’s womb/ova,
embryo donation still disrupts male paternity and involves the acceptance
by an already married woman of another man’s (and woman’s) gametes.
Moreover, a woman’s acceptance of another woman’s egg is eﬀectively like
gestational surrogacy, which is strictly prohibited in Sunni Islam. Indeed, in
recent months, cases of surrogate motherhood have occurred in Iran,
despite the lack of ﬁrm legislation regarding this practice.
Whether these problematic complications of embryo donation have been
carefully thought through by the religious and legal authorities in Iran is
unclear. Based on her path-breaking research carried out at Iranian IVF
clinics, anthropologist Soraya Tremayne (2005, 2006) notes, ‘‘My ﬁrst and
possibly superﬁcial interpretation at this stage can only be that the moral,
ethical and legal aspects of the whole matter have not yet been thought
through and the consequences dawned on either the doctors and legislators,
or on people themselves. It seems to me that ethics will follow, rather than
lead the issue. These operations have been in place only for the past ten
years ... and the cases are too new to cause problems as yet’’ (personal
communication, 23 July 2004).
It is interesting to note that many Shi’ite religious leaders both inside and
outside of Iran do not agree with the relative Iranian ‘‘permissiveness’’ vis-a`-vis
donor technologies; instead, they abide by the dominant Sunni Muslim
ban on all forms of third-party donation. For example, I recently attended a
two-day conference in Tehran, Iran, on ‘‘Gamete and Embryo Donation,’’
sponsored by the Avesina Research Institute in association with the Law
and Political Science Faculty of the University of Tehran.3 The conference
provided a fascinating example of ‘‘ijtihad in action,’’ with some ulama,
dressed in their stately robes and turbans (black for the sayyids, or
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), arguing against the moral per-
missibility of embryo and gamete donation. The disagreements generated in
public between ‘‘pro’’ and ‘‘con’’ ulama were also debated in the more
private recesses of the conference. For example, a Shi’ite shari’a judge from
Bahrain, who was staying at our guest residence, took great pains to de-
scribe to me his opposition to all forms of gamete donation. To prove this
point, he provided me with a copy of his book on Islamic personal status
law, which had been translated into English and which supported his anti–
gamete donation position based on evidence from the traditional Islamic
scriptures. According to him, Iranian clergy, who speak Farsi rather than
Arabic, are not as familiar with the original Islamic scriptures (in Arabic)
that demonstrate the immorality of third-party donation. Thus, in his view,
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some Iranian clergy are ‘‘innovating’’ in ways that are religiously unac-
ceptable, and that are at odds with the rest of the Muslim world.
A case in point: ayatollahs Ali al-Sistani and Muhammad Sa’id
al-Tabataba’i al-Hakim, both Shi’ite religious authorities in Iraq, advise
caution against third-party donation practices, viewing them as largely
unacceptable (Clarke 2006). Indeed, Ayatollah al-Sistani’s son, Muhammad
Rida Al-Sistani, has devoted an entire volume of richly documented legal
analysis to this debate, providing ‘‘an invaluable resource for other schol-
ars’’ (26). According to Clarke, ‘‘Sistani’s work, while perhaps posing more
questions than clear answers, opens up for other scholars a fascinating
window into this area of Shi’ite jurisprudential debate, at a time when the
Western media are just waking up to the vibrant engagement Shi’ite scholars
have had with other such new technologies’’ (26).
Indeed, the degree to which some Shi’ite clergy are ‘‘pushing the enve-
lope’’ in the realm of reproductive science and technology is quite remark-
able. At the recent gamete donation conference in Iran, some Iranian clergy
and physicians present advocated for future laws permitting all forms of
donation as well as surrogacy. Once passed into law, gamete donation of all
kinds will be diﬃcult to stop. Meanwhile, in the absence of formal legisla-
tion, some IVF physicians in Tehran—as well as in Shi’ite-dominant Leb-
anon, which is closely following the Iranian lead—are using the legal
vacuum and the original ‘‘permissive’’ fatwa of Ayatollah Khamanei to
practice all forms of gamete donation among their desperate infertile
patients. As noted by Clarke (2006) for Lebanon, ‘‘Doctors keep Khama-
nei’s fatwa collection on the shelves of their surgeries to demonstrate the
permissibility of such procedures to skeptical Muslim patients; and many
such patients have proﬁted from it to undertake donor sperm and egg
procedures, even surrogacy arrangements, with a clear conscience’’ (26).
MUSLIM PATIENT OPPOSITION TO DONATION
Although donor law and practice are headed in interesting new directions in
both Iran and Lebanon, it must be reiterated that the vast majority of
Muslims, both Shi’ite and Sunni, do not accept the idea of third-party
gamete donation. Why are they opposed to donation?
In the hundreds of interviews that I have conducted since 1996 in Egypt
(with Sunni Muslims) and Lebanon (with both Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims),
the majority of infertile couples were clear that donation is haram, or
forbidden by the religion (Inhorn 2006b). Patient concerns revolve around
three sets of related issues: (1) the moral implications of third-party
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donation for marriage, (2) the potential for incest, and (3) the moral
implications of donation for kinship and family life.
With regard to marriage, Islam is a religion that can be said to privi-
lege—even mandate—heterosexual marital relations. As is made clear in the
original Al-Azhar fatwa, reproduction outside of marriage is considered
zina, or adultery, which is strictly forbidden in Islam.
Although third-party donation does not involve the sexual ‘‘body
contact’’ of adulterous relations, or presumably the desire to engage in an
extramarital aﬀair, it is nonetheless considered by most Islamic religious
scholars to be a form of adultery, by virtue of introducing a third party into
the sacred dyad of husband and wife. It is the very fact that another man’s
sperm or another woman’s eggs enter a place where they do not belong that
makes donation of any kind inherently wrong and threatening to the marital
bond.
The other aspect of third-party donation that troubles marriage is the
potential for incest among the oﬀspring of unknown donors. Moral con-
cerns have been raised about the potential for a single anonymous donor’s
oﬀspring to meet and marry each other, thereby undertaking an incestuous
union of half-siblings.
The ﬁnal moral concern voiced by Muslim IVF patients is that third-party
donation confuses issues of kinship, descent, and inheritance. As with
marriage, Islam is a religion that can be said to privilege—even man-
date—biological inheritance. Preserving the ‘‘origins’’ of each
child—meaning its relationship to a known biological mother and father—is
considered not only an ideal in Islam, but a moral imperative. The problem
with third-party donation, therefore, is that it destroys a child’s lineage,
which is immoral in addition to being psychologically devastating.
Muslim IVF patients use the term ‘‘mixture of relations’’ to describe this
untoward outcome. Such a mixture of relations, or the literal confusion of
lines of descent introduced by third-party donation, is described as being
very ‘‘dangerous,’’ ‘‘forbidden,’’ ‘‘against nature,’’ ‘‘against God’’—in a
word, haram, or morally unacceptable. It is argued that donation, by
allowing a ‘‘stranger to enter the family,’’ confuses lines of descent in pat-
rilineal Islamic societies. For men in particular, ensuring paternity and the
‘‘purity’’ of lineage through ‘‘known fathers’’ is of paramount concern
(Inhorn 2006b). As one Sunni Muslim man, a high school biology teacher,
summarized the problem:
The most important thing is that we are Muslims. If there is faith in carrying out this
operation using sperm from the husband and ova from the wife, then this is okay.
We cannot accept what happens in the West. We heard some women ‘‘hire the
womb’’ of another woman, or take sperm. According to our religion, this is called
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ikhtilat in-nasab, ‘‘mixing relations.’’ We consider it some kind of zina, prostitution.
Because there are many hadiths from the Prophet Muhammad that conﬁrm this. If
you put your sperm in another woman besides your wife, you go to hell. This is
adultery. There is a hadith on adultery. ‘‘If you put your sperm in another woman
other than your wife, you are going to commit a sin.’’ People asked the Prophet,
‘‘How?’’ He said, ‘‘If you put it in your wife, you are going to be rewarded from
Allah.’’ They said, ‘‘Yes.’’ He told them, ‘‘But this is also the case if you put it in the
wrong womb. You are going to have punishment.’’
In addition to the consequences of mixed bloodlines and adultery,
bringing such donor children into the world is considered unfair to the
children themselves, who would never be treated with the love and concern
parents feel for their ‘‘real’’ children. Such a child could only be viewed as a
bastard—an ibn haram, literally ‘‘son of sin.’’ Thus, a child of third-party
donation starts life oﬀ as an ‘‘illegal’’ child. The child is deemed illegitimate
and stigmatized even in the eyes of his or her own parents, who will
therefore lack the appropriate parental sentiments (Inhorn 2006b). As one
Sunni Muslim IVF patient stated:
My baby must be mine, and from my husband. This is logical. A mother will never
feel this is her child if it is from another [man’s] donated sperm or ova. It’s only
natural. Everything must occur naturally. If the child is from the father and mother,
they will feel this is actually our baby. If not, we’ll not be a family. The feeling of the
baby, and our feelings. You will feel like you’re acting, making a movie, living a life
that’s not true. This is our feeling. Of course, people take babies [through adoption],
but this is not so common here in Egypt. We don’t even want to think about this
point! We are making our trial [of IVF] and hoping God will help us.
Indeed, the ﬁrm conviction that parenthood of a donor child is an
impossibility is clearly linked to the legal and cultural prohibitions against
adoption throughout the Muslim world. The Islamic scriptures, including
the Qur’an, encourage the kind fostering of orphans but do not allow legal
adoption as it is known in the West, whereby a child takes its adoptive
parents’ surname and is treated as one’s own child (Inhorn 1996; Sonbol
1995; Zuhur 1992). In the Muslim Middle East, few IVF patients, either
Sunni or Shi’ite, will contemplate adoption, stating with conviction that it is
‘‘against the religion’’ and that the adopted child ‘‘won’t be my own son’’
(Inhorn 2006b). Even though legal adoption is practiced in Iran—with the
child receiving a birth certiﬁcate in the adoptive couple’s name after a
six-month period of adjustment—the social and cultural resistances to
adoption remain strong in that country, making this a ‘‘last resort’’ for
infertile Iranian couples (Janet Heindl, personal communication, 8 July
2004; Tober 2004).
Nonetheless, Iran’s acceptance of adoption has clearly paved the way for
gamete donation, with Ayatollah Khamanei’s initial fatwa deeming the
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infertile couple to be like adoptive parents. Indeed, Iran’s clearly adven-
turous path regarding both adoption and donation is leading to social
transformations in other parts of the Shi’ite Middle East, in ways described
in the following section.
MARRIAGE AND GENDER RELATIONS
In considering infertility and IVF in the Muslim world, it is important to
ask: What happens to infertile Middle Eastern Muslim couples who are not
allowed to adopt and who do not accept the use of donor gametes? In the
absence of adoption and gamete donation, infertile Muslim couples have no
choice but to turn to IVF and other assisted reproductive technologies to
solve their infertility problems using their own gametes.
In the Middle Eastern Muslim world, marriage is highly valued, and
nearly all adults marry if possible in most Middle Eastern countries (Pop-
ulation Reference Bureau 2004; Zuhur 1992). Middle Eastern societies are
also pronatalist—they highly value children for numerous reasons and
expect all marriages to produce them (Inhorn 1996). Thus, the notion of a
married couple living happily without children is unthinkable. Children are
desired from the beginning of marriage in most cases, and are usually loved
and cherished once they are born.
As a result, childless couples are often under tremendous social pressure
to conceive. In the Muslim world, infertile women often live in fear that
their marriages will ‘‘collapse,’’ for Islamic personal status laws consider a
wife’s barrenness to be a major ground for divorce. Although Islam also
allows women to divorce if male infertility can be proven, a woman’s
initiation of divorce continues to be so stigmatizing that women rarely
choose this option unless their marriages are truly unbearable (Inhorn
1996). Instead, they often ‘‘cover’’ for their infertile husbands, accepting the
social responsibility for the infertility and diﬀusing the embarrassment of
their husbands’ reproductive emasculation (Inhorn 2003b, 2004).
The emergence of the revolutionary new IVF technology called intracy-
toplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), however, has ironically increased the
potential for divorce in the Muslim Middle East. Namely, with ICSI,
infertile men with very poor sperm proﬁles—even azoospermia, or lack of
sperm in the ejaculate—are now able to produce ‘‘biological’’ children of
their own. As long as a single viable spermatozoon can be retrieved from a
man’s body, including through painful testicular aspirations and biopsies,
this spermatozoon can be injected directly into the ovum under a high-
powered microscope. What ICSI requires, then, is high-quality ova, despite
442 M.C. INHORN
low-quality sperm. However, the wives of many of these men, who have
‘‘stood by’’ their infertile husbands for years, even decades in some cases,
may have grown too old to produce viable ova for the ICSI procedure. In
the absence of adoption or of any kind of egg donation, infertile Muslim
couples with a reproductively ‘‘elderly’’ wife face four diﬃcult options: (1) to
remain together permanently without children; (2) to legally foster an
orphan, which is rarely viewed as an acceptable option; (3) to remain
together in a polygynous marriage, which is rarely viewed as an acceptable
option by women themselves; or (4) to divorce so that the husband can have
children with a younger wife.
In my research in Egypt and Lebanon, the ﬁrst option has proven to be
the most common—namely, infertile husbands and their 40-something wives
often love each other deeply, and remain together in long-term marriages
without producing any children. Thus, divorce is not the immediate con-
sequence of infertility that it is stereotypically portrayed to be. Because of
the Sunni Islamic restrictions on the use of donor eggs, however, as well as
lack of acceptance of this option among some segments of the Shi’ite
population, at least some Muslim men are choosing to divorce or take a
second wife, believing that their own reproductive destinies lie with younger,
more fertile women.
That being said, in the Shi’ite Muslim world, including in Iran and
Lebanon, at least some Shi’ite couples are beginning to receive both donor
gametes and donor embryos,4 as well as donating their gametes to other
infertile couples. For infertile Shi’ite couples who accept the idea of third-
party donation—as well as for Ayatollah Khamanei, who originally intro-
duced the idea of donation to the Muslim world—the introduction of donor
technologies has been described as a ‘‘marriage savior,’’ helping to avoid the
‘‘marital and psychological disputes’’ that may arise if the couple’s case is
otherwise untreatable. Such disputes are clearly dramatized in the popular
Iranian ﬁlm Laila, which documents the painful separation of an otherwise
happily married but infertile couple, and which was released in the
mid-1990s before the Khamanei fatwa permitted such marriages to be saved
through the use of donor technologies.
In Iran today, donor egg and donor embryo programs have been set up at
most IVF clinics. Donor eggs come from three sources: other IVF patients,
relatives,5 and unmarried women who agree to participate as egg donors in
one-day mutca marriages for a fee. Such marriages only require a witness
and are not oﬃcially registered; thus, they take place in conﬁdence in the
back rooms of IVF clinics. Indeed, donors who wish to remain anonymous
enter these mutca marriages only by written agreement, without ever
meeting the recipients of their eggs or their temporary husbands. They
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receive their money following egg harvesting (usually about U.S. $550),
provide no personal information about themselves to the recipient couple,
receive no information about the recipient couple, and ‘‘go about their
business’’ (Soraya Tremayne, personal communication, 31 July 2004). In
short, egg donation—as well as embryo donation from other couples—is
largely a ﬁnancial transaction in Iran, with very little regulation or control
over who donates or how donation is enacted.
The same is not true for the receiving of embryos. According to Trema-
yne, the recent law in Iran speciﬁes clearly that couples desiring an embryo
as a result of infertility must apply in writing to a court in order to receive
permission for embryo transfer. The law speciﬁes that the couple must be
morally sound and suitable as parents and must be Iranian citizens, much
like the law governing adoption in Iran (Janet Heindl, personal communi-
cation, 8 July 2004). Still, the donor embryo law is so new that most IVF
clinics in Iran do not yet own a copy of the legislation and are not neces-
sarily abiding by the legal requirements for donor embryo transfer at their
clinics. If the husband is infertile, the couple simply receives another cou-
ple’s embryos, with most donor couples choosing to remain anonymous. As
Tremayne (31 July 2004) states,
I did not get the impression that people desperate to have a child thought very far
about the issues of kinship and family relations. As far as I could see, the donation is
considered more a financial transaction than a donation/gift, and once you have paid
the couple to buy their embryo, or paid the temporary wife for her egg, they have no
further claims on you and this is the end of the story. The forms filled by the donors
leave it to them to decide whether they want to give their name or not.
In Lebanon where I have conducted my own research, the situation is
very similar, despite the lack of a national law governing any aspect of IVF
or third-party donation.6 At Lebanese IVF clinics providing donor tech-
nologies, some of the donors are other IVF patients (mostly Shi’ite Muslims
who accept the idea of donation), some are friends or relatives (including
egg-donor sisters), and some are anonymous donors, who provide their ova
for a fee. In at least one clinic catering to a largely conservative Shi’ite
clientele, some of these donors are young non-Muslim, American women
who travel to Lebanon for extra payment to donate their eggs anonymously
to infertile Lebanese couples. Ironically, those most likely to receive these
‘‘American eggs’’ are conservative Shi’ite couples, who accept the idea of
donation because they follow the teachings of Ayatollah Khamanei in Iran.
Thus, in Lebanon, those most likely to follow the spiritual guidance of
Ayatollah Khamanei—and, hence, to receive American donor eggs—are
generally members of or sympathizers with Lebanon’s Hizbullah political
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party, which is oﬃcially described by the U.S. administration as a terrorist
organization!
Furthermore, quite interestingly, in multisectarian Lebanon, the recipi-
ents of these donor eggs are not necessarily only Shi’ite Muslim couples.
Some Sunni Muslim patients from Lebanon and from other Middle Eastern
Muslim countries such as Egypt and Syria are quietly slipping across
transnational borders to ‘‘save their marriages’’ through the use of donor
gametes, thereby secretly ‘‘going against’’ the dictates of Sunni Muslim
orthodoxy. Such border crossing has also been noted by Clarke (2006) for
Lebanon; he writes, ‘‘Indeed patients come from other countries to beneﬁt
from this relatively relaxed regime’’ (26). The same is true in Iran, where,
according to IVF clinic staﬀ, scores of Persian Gulf Arabs from countries
such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are traveling to Tehran in pursuit of
donor gametes.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is fair to state that global reproductive ‘‘technoscapes’’
(Appadurai 1996) are becoming increasingly expansive as we enter this new
millennium. As this article has tried to show, the Muslim world—generally
positioned on the receiving end of global reproductive technology trans-
fers—has nonetheless embraced assisted reproductive technologies with
considerable enthusiasm while, at the same time, reconﬁguring them in
accordance with the local religious moralities so important in this region.
Although generally portrayed as monolithic, Islam itself takes several
diﬀerent forms, as evident in this essay. In the Sunni Muslim world, which
includes most Middle Eastern countries, the use of IVF and related assisted
reproductive technologies has clearly led to an entrenchment of deeply held
religious beliefs about the importance of biologically based kinship, family
life, and parenthood. Yet the globalization of these technologies to the
Shi’ite Muslim world has fundamentally altered understandings of the ways
in which families can be made and the ways in which marriages can be saved
through the uses of assisted reproductive technologies.
For Shi’ite Muslims, in particular, the frankly adventurous attitude on
the part of some Shi’ite religious leaders toward third-party donation has
led to a potential transformation in gender relations among infertile
Muslim couples. For example, in Lebanon, the recent Shi’ite fatwas
allowing egg donation have been a great boon to marital relations. There,
both fertile and infertile men with ‘‘reproductively elderly’’ wives are
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lining up at IVF clinics to accept the eggs of donor women. Furthermore,
in multisectarian Lebanon, the recipients of donor gametes are not
necessarily only Shi’ite Muslim couples, but include some Sunni Muslim
and Christian couples as well.
In short, the arrival of donor technologies in the Muslim Middle East has
led to a brave new world of reproductive possibility never imagined when
these technologies were ﬁrst introduced there nearly 20 years ago. These
technologies have engendered (1) signiﬁcant medical transnationalism and
reproductive tourism; (2) mixing of gametes across ethnic, racial, and reli-
gious lines; and (3) the birth of thousands of ICSI and, now, donor babies to
devout infertile Muslim couples. Infertile couples have begun to reconsider
traditional notions of biological kinship, even if ‘‘social parenthood’’ of a
donor child is still not widely embraced (Inhorn 2006b). And because donor
technologies are now widely available in both Iran and Lebanon, the power
of the Sunni Muslim ban on third-party donation is being weakened across
the region, with some infertile Sunni Muslim couples reconsidering their
own antidonation moral stances. As a result, Shi’ite gametes are ﬁnding
their ways into Sunni bodies, an interesting variation on the ‘‘making of
Muslim babies.’’
In my view, these multiple transformations are powerful indicators of
the profound social eﬀects that reproductive technologies may engender
in the new world order. As the assisted reproductive technologies become
further entrenched in the Muslim world, and additional forms of global
reproductive technology become available, it is important to examine the
new local moral worlds that are likely to arise in response to this variant
of globalization. The pace of change evident in the production of assisted
reproductive technologies themselves—as highlighted on the recent Nova
special called ‘‘18 Ways to Make a Baby’’—as well as the rapid spread of
these technologies into far reaches of the non-Western world is, indeed,
striking. Thus, as one science and technology studies scholar, David Hess
(1994), rightly observes, ‘‘Anthropology brings to these discussions a
reminder that the cultural construction of science is a global phenome-
non, and that the ongoing dialogue of technoculture often takes its most
interesting turns in areas of the world outside the developed West’’ (16).
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NOTES
1. To overcome the diﬃculties of raising a biologically unrelated donor child,
some Shi’ite physicians in Lebanon are arguing for a variety of novel solutions,
including inheritance through gifts and bequests; institutions of rida’ (milk kinship),
whereby the mother of a donor child becomes related to it through breastfeeding;
and the notion of legal guardianship of foster children (Clarke 2006).
2. I am deeply grateful to Soraya Tremayne, who, fresh from ﬁeldwork in Iran,
has engaged in a lively e-mail discussion with me and has provided invaluable
information on the practices of IVF and gamete donation in Iran since 2004. I have
tried to represent her ﬁndings as accurately as possible in this paper.
3. In Iran, I want to thank Mohammad Jalal Abassi-Shavazi, Mohamad Mehdi
Akhondi, and Pegah Ebadi for so generously inviting and hosting me at the Avesina
Research Center and University of Tehran conference on embryo and gamete
donation.
4. In Lebanon, anonymous sperm donation—using frozen sperm from overseas
sperm banks or fresh sperm samples from mostly medical and graduate students—is
‘‘quietly’’ practiced at IVF clinics. One of my azoospermic Lebanese male informants
produced a donor child in this way, and several others, both Muslim and Christian,
had also made the decision to use donor sperm.
5. In Iran, women commonly bring their sisters as potential egg donors. But this
is not allowed, as Islam is explicitly against the marriage of one man to two living
sisters. Apparently, men also bring their brothers as potential sperm donors in Iran.
According to Tremayne, she observed one case where the husband did so without his
wife’s knowledge; the wife believed that she was receiving her husband’s sperm
instead of that of her brother-in-law.
6. Some leading members of the Lebanese medical community are pushing for a
law that bans all forms of third-party donation in the country. However, this law has
yet to be debated in the Lebanese parliament and is unlikely to pass, according to
some sources.
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